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What determines the propensity to reduce or widen the extent of public ownership? Why has there been a 
tendency to privatise and concede public utilities during the nineties? The answers to these questions 
depend both on macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations. And correct answers could also help 
to avoid or prevent inefficient reversals and frustrations that jeopardize reform processes. An alternative 
perspective, that combines micro and macro arguments, is given by general equilibrium models. The 
objective of this paper is to explore the rationality of the decision of choosing the implicit “technologies” 
of private and public operators of utilities in an economy that has fiscal budget and trade balance in 
equilibrium. The simulations confirm that the choice of the technology to be used for servicing 
infrastructure depends on deep parameters of efficiency and costs. The model shows that there are 
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What determines the propensity to reduce or widen the extent of public 
ownership? Why has there been a tendency to privatise and concede public utilities 
during the nineties? 
The answers to these questions depend both on macroeconomic and 
microeconomic considerations. And correct answers could also help to avoid or prevent 
inefficient reversals and frustrations that jeopardize reform processes. 
On the microeconomic side, there are two prominent theories1. One, emphasizes 
the role of public ownership to resolve contractual problems and to influence the 
decisions of the firms in certain sensitive issues for the politicians; it is easier to control 
the decisions of the firm (on employment levels, for example) when the company is 
under public ownership. The other focuses on the self exclusion of private sector under 
government opportunism; if taxes and regulations are too unstable and endogenous, risk 
of arbitrariness discourages private investments, and public ownership is the only 
possibility. 
Macro considerations have been concentrated in the need of controlling public 
deficits, obtaining revenues from privatisations and concessions, fostering growth 
through efficiency enhancements and obtaining price reductions via competitive 
environments. 
One additional point to consider is the all-or-nothing character of the choice. 
That is, are there gains of having private operators coexisting and competing with a 
public enterprise? 
There are two aspects to take into account: 
 
                                               
1 According to Esfahani and Ardakani (2004).  
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1) Efficiency gains given the reciprocal benchmarking, though in this case it is 
difficult to say why not benchmarking private operators and why a mix 
public/private is better. 
2) Gains due to harder competition, though a similar observation applies and 
competition could prevail between private operators. In fact, having only private 
operators could alleviate potential problems of moral hazard of public sector 
being involved simultaneously in operation and regulation.   
 
2. The general equilibrium approach. 
 
An alternative perspective, that combines micro and macro arguments, is given 
by general equilibrium models. This perspective has not been fully explored, and there 
are only a few examples –e.g. Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999). Beyond short term 
increases in revenue for the governments, efficiency gains for the economy could justify 
higher presence of private sector.  
General equilibrium gives a framework of consistency that impedes counting 
gains more than once, obliges to represent budget constraints of all agents –including 
transfers- and gives net welfare results after taking into account changes in relative 
prices and factor rewards. In fact, changes in factor rewards could change expected 
gains of privatisations and government activity…or not. And it is in the last case when 
arguments in favour of private operation are stronger.  
In this paper the objective is to explore the rationality of the decision of 
choosing the implicit “technologies” of private and public operators of utilities in an 
economy that has fiscal budget and trade balance in equilibrium. 
We do not consider neither asymmetries of information nor political 
opportunism. They are certainly important elements to take into account, but it seems to 
be also relevant to focus on the core of the workings of the economy. What happens 
with relative prices and factor rewards after the privatisation or concession, net welfares 
gains and their distribution –even or not- the sensitivity of the decision to changes in 
fundamental parameters, like the cost of capital, deserve deeper examination. 
In broad terms, we will assume that the extreme cases of public and private 
operation have the following differences: 
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 Public enterprises show lower efficiency levels in the use of intermediate inputs 
and employment.  
 This inefficiency implies that public enterprises must be subsidized, and 
therefore, that taxes or prices of utilities services must be higher.  
 This inefficiency is also present in the investment process: one unit of 
investment produces more units of capital installed under private operation (or 
less units of investments are needed to compose one unit of capital).  
 However the share of imported intermediate inputs is higher in the case of 
private operators, since new investments and methods are complementary of 
inputs and services provided by the rest of the world. 
 Capital reward of private operators in determined basically by its cost of 
opportunity in the rest of the world. 
 
Given these elements, the typical choice will involve:  
 Taking into account that evidence tends to confirm that under public hands 
inefficiencies are higher, that more resources will be necessary to operate 
utilities diverting them from other (valuable) activities, and that subsidies will 
have to be covered with taxes or higher prices and that this creates further 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources.  
 Realizing that though private operators are more efficient, productivity of capital 
in the rest of the world becomes a relevant benchmark as the minimum required 
reward for private capital, and that potential transfer of dividends abroad could 
put pressure on trade balance. The economy will enjoy higher efficiency and 
performance standards, but at the cost of having to devote more resources to 
export markets.  
 
So the basic comparison can be reduced to the minimum cost choice between 
contributing to exports with local effort and consumption sacrifice or accepting 
inefficiencies and costs of misallocation of resources due to subsidisation. The intention 
is trying to give general equilibrium hints to the answers posed at the beginning of this 
paper and to consider thresholds for the cost of capital and public funds full costs that 
explain rational choices.  
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There are some provisos to take into consideration. The results must be 
examined both under full employment and unemployment; in the last case, the results 
will depend on the rule of indexation of wages. Under unemployment, efficiency gains 
will be more important for obtaining increases in scales of operation that will influence 
positively welfare. 
Asymmetries of information are not part of the model. It is true that they a 
cornerstone of regulatory economics, but at this stages the differences of dealing with 
them under public or private operation will only add confusion to the results. In fact, 
especially under high-powered regimes, the capacity and willingness to deal with 
asymmetries of information will be probably higher under private hands and that would 
be a reason for recommending private ownership or operation. But, what of the costs? 
 
3. Basic analytical structure. 
 
The analysis is based on a standard CGE model with regulation and service 
obligations (see Box 1). So the economy must choose between: 1) a local technology 
provided by the public enterprises, or 2) an updated –probably capital intensive- 
technology that uses mobile capital. 
A fundamental difference of these technologies is that while capital is 
considered a sunk cost for public enterprises, it is not for private operators, though these 
conditions can be relaxed. The idea is to compare the on going model –the public 




BOX  1:  Regulatory Regimes and Service Obligations in a CGE 
 
Service obligation is interpreted as the passive adjustment of services supply to demand in the regulated sector. 
This assumption prevents need to rely on rationing which is quite realistic in the context of modern 
infrastructure reforms. If this assumption were not included, we would need to accept some form of rationing 
of customers (households or firms), and this will make any model much more complicated and ad-hoc. 
Most regulatory regimes establish explicitly this obligation in the contract, and its violation has not only direct 
economic costs but also hinders on the reputation of the firm. Service obligation increases costs to the firm 
(real and expected) and is compensated with the tariff and, very often, with the commitment by the regulator 
of protecting incumbents by legally blocking the entry of new competitors. A temporary “no entry” condition 
is, in fact,  a second important characteristics of modern infrastructure reforms, which guarantees a return on 
assets, when perceived commercial risk levels could be aggravated by the concern for entry and become a 
participation constraint for the private sector. 
With the Service Obligation hypothesis, there are two possible cases. In the first case, there is enough installed 
capacity to cover the necessities of clients and the main issue is for the firm to get a subsidy to cover the 
difference between marginal cost and regulated price.  In the second case, the capacity is insufficient and 
additional investment is needed.  This second option (with constant marginal costs) is used exceptionally when 
demand becomes too high. For the first option, we assume that the subsidy is paid by the shareholders of the 
firm in the case of the price-cap regime.  With this strategy, existence of equilibrium can be shown using the 
proofs already available for the standard general equilibrium models with taxes. The price-cap or the rate-of-
return regulation can be interpreted as special mark-up rules that are in fact taxes for which the revenue 
accrues to (or is extracted from) the owners of the firms. 
To simplify, it may be useful to complement the discussion with a graphic beginning with the model of 
alternative technology. In fact, Graph 1 shows the case of an alternative technology when demand (Da) is low 
enough as to have excess of installed capacity. PR and qR denote the tariff in terms of the numeraire and the 
production level in the regulated sector, respectively. MC represents the marginal cost of the existing 
technology (the increasing segment) and an alternative technology (the constant marginal cost section of the 
curve), and 1/ stands for the benchmark regulated price. 
Given Da, pR should fall to 0Rp . However, a tax t is imposed (mark-up) to compensate owners of capital so that 
1 *(1 )R Rp t p   = 1/.  
“Tax” revenue is transferred from customers to shareholders of the regulated firm. This t could be negative as 
it is shown in Graph 2, that it is a subsidy s. If an alternative technology does not exist, the firm will continue 
operating if the additional units (A) marginal costs are covered (triangle S). Since the obligation of service was 
established in the original contract between the regulators and shareholders, we assume that the shareholders 
cover the excess of costs –implicitly in the form of a subsidy to the operative management of the firm. This 
internal subsidy s is depicted in the figure below; in this case s is computed so that net price to customers 
equals the price-cap settled at level Rp .  
In summary, Graph 2 shows the case of an internal subsidy, funded with a tax on  the shareholders of the 
regulated firm. When shareholders are foreign, this subsidy will be accompanied by an inflow of capital that 
reduces the need of trade surplus. Graph 2 also illustrates the case when the firm has the alternative of 
importing international capital. The incremental cost of the new technology is given by w*A/µ, where w* is the 
foreign factor reward and µ its average productivity. The firm will compare this cost with S, to choose the 
method for servicing the market. However, this will have consequences on the current account; if the firm 
covers the deficit with the existing technology there will be an inflow of capital (though temporary); instead if 
the alternative technology is employed, the  additional reward of foreign factors will impose a burden. 
The literature on existence of equilibrium with taxes –see Shoven and Whalley (1973) and Ginsburgh and 
Keyzer (1997)- can be used in this case with minor adaptations. 
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Graph 1: Non-operative price-cap  
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Graph 2: Subsidy and alternative technology 
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Source: Chisari, Estache, Lambardi y Romero (2003). 
 
To simulate the model we will use a Social Accounting Matrix of reduced 
dimensions that captures the main characteristics of a developing economy, in terms of 
share of public services in GDP. 
There is a basic structure that will be specialized to consider the public and 
private technologies. For the sake of presentation, the public technology is discussed 
first. 
Each sector uses two different factors: one mobile, labor, and one non mobile, 
specific capital2. There are four domestic sectors of production (activities): I={1,2,N,R}, 
two of them are tradable sectors, T={1,2}, and the rest are producers of goods and 
                                               
2 A summary of the main characteristics of these models can be found in Bhagwati et al. (2000). 
MC 
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services that are not tradable; sector N produces services and sector R represents sectors 
under regulation.  
Each activity produces only one commodity represented by J={1,2,N,R}. We 
assume that the utility and production functions correspond to the traditional 
neoclassical version. However, production sectors are related through input-output 
transactions, which play an important role in understanding the net impact of regulation 
on the economy. Prices of tradable goods are determined by the rest of the world3, and 
domestic agents also import consumption goods that are imperfect substitutes of local 
production. In this version, it is assumed that imported goods are not used for 
production. 
The analytical representation of the aggregated regulated sector in this section 
deserves more attention. Though it is natural to think that the production function of that 
sector should exhibit some economies of scale or sub-additivity, we will assume that 
there are not non-convexities once specific capital is installed. This is a simplification 
with obvious theoretical costs, but it also contributes to concentrate our effort in 
determining the impact of regulatory mechanisms and not on the properties of the 
production set4. The public technology works with installed capital. The alternative 
technology gives some hints on the long run effects; in that case, we assume constant 
returns to scale. 
Domestic household. 
We assume that there is an only domestic agent that makes the decision on the 
consumption plan and receives all factor rewards (except for the regulated firm) and 
profits. So, we will not be paying attention to personal income distribution matters, 
though we can analyze factor distribution. This agent collects also all taxes and grants 
subsidies. Net welfare of this household will therefore represent social welfare. 
The domestic agent maximizes the utility function 1 2( , , , , )N Ru c c c c m subject to: 
                                               
3 The “small country assumption” in terms of  Kehoe and Kehoe (1994). 
4 Dierker et al (1985) present an analysis of the existence of equilibrium when there are special pricing 






  ( , )
R
IT T R R N N m I R R R
T I R
p c p c p c p m wL r K tp G L K          
where   is the share of domestic agents in profits of the regulated sector *
R
 and the last 
term corresponds to the compensatory transfer from domestic customers ( t  0) or to 
the firm from its shareholders (t  0). Under public ownership,   = 1. In both cases, 
under price cap, t is computed so that  pR = 1/(1+t). From utility maximization, we 
obtain the familiar first order conditions: 
<2> ' '
Tc m T m
u u p p  
<3> ' 'R m R mu u p p  
<4> ' 'N m N mu u p p  
cT is consumption of domestic tradable goods, cR is the consumption of goods and 
services under regulation and m are imports (a good produced abroad but not 
domestically) and pT, pR and pm are their respective prices. w is the wage rate and rI is  
the rate of return on capital in each sector. L  and K represent the domestic agent 
endowments of labor and capital.   
Domestic Production Sectors 
F, H and G are the production function of the tradable, non-tradable and 
regulated sectors, respectively. We assume constant returns to scales in all cases. As we 
mentioned, this is a simplification that helps to avoid problems of existence of 
equilibrium. However, in this version, once capital is sunk, it does not seem to be 
unrealistic. 
a.  Tradable Sectors 
There is one firm that maximizes profits in each tradable sector. The net price for the 
firm is the price to consumers less the cost of intermediate inputs..  
<5>      , , , ( , )T T J T J R T R N T N T T T T T T
J T T
p a p a p a p F L K wL r K

      
  
    
for every T=1,2. Notice that firms observe the incentive given by the net price after 
intermediate inputs costs. The maximum profit conditions are: 
<6> , , ,T J T J R T R N T N L
J T
p a p a p a p F w





<7> , , ,T J T J R T R N T N K T
J T
p a p a p a p F r

    
  
  
In both cases, the value of marginal product (corrected for intermediate costs) is 
equalized to the reward of the factor. Notice that we are not assuming export or import 
taxes but they can be introduced easily as ad valorem taxes.   
b.  Non-tradable Sector 
 Services and other non tradable goods are produced using labor and capital. 
Capital is specialized and non mobile. Equation (8) corresponds to profits definition, 
and equations (9) and (10) to optimization conditions: 
 
<8> , , ( , )N N T N T R N R N N N N N
T
p a p a p H L K wL r K      
  
  
<9> , ,N T N T R N R L
T
p a p a p H w   
  
  
<10> , ,N T N T R N R N N
T
p a p a p H r   
  
  
c.  Public utilities or regulated sector 
As we mentioned above, the regulated firm is treated as a neoclassical firm. 
There is no entry and service obligations are established. Net price is obtained as the 
difference between the regulated price and intermediate cost. 
<11> , , ( , )R R T R T N R N R R R
T
p a p a p G L K wL     
  
  
Notice that in this expression KR is given. The total rate of return of this sector is 
/R R Rr K . The optimal condition for profits is: 
<12> , ,R T R T N R N L
T
p a p b p G w   
  
  
aR,T and aT,R are input-output coefficients used to represent also technical gains due to 
privatization. A reduction in aT,R is an improvement of efficiency internal to the public 
service firms, which reduces the requirement of intermediate inputs per unit of product. 
aR,T is a reduction of the requirement of regulated input per unit of tradable output (due 
to a better performance of private operators).  
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Rest of the world. 
a. Production sectors. 
 
The rest of the world produces substitutes for our exports and import goods, 
using a factor of production F. Equations (19) to (22) give an alternative technology 
available for foreign owners to fulfill their obligation of services, using mobile capital.  
<13> * *( )
m m m m
p F w F    
<14> * *( )
T T T T T
p F w F    
<15> *mp w    
<16> *T Tp w    
<17> ( )s mm F  
<18> ( )s T Tx F  
In the case of α’ and T   constants, international terms of trade will be given by 




T  represent profits in the rest of the world industries that produce 
import goods and perfect substitutes of tradable goods. w*, the numeraire, is the wage 
rate of the only factor used abroad. 
Fm and FT are factor quantities employed in the corresponding industries. The 
production functions: α(Fm) and βT(FT) give the total supply in equations <16>, <17> 
and <18>. 
b. Households 
Consumers in the rest of the world receive the rents of foreign factors, including 
capital installed in the regulated sector as well as profits in that sector. It maximizes a 
utility function *( , )Tv x m  that depends on the consumption of our tradable goods and of 
import goods. Their budget condition is: 
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<19> * * * *(1 ) ( , )m T T R m T R R R
T
p m p x w F tp G L K                                                                                                                          
Foreign agent receives profits and capital return of the regulated sector, as well as the 
wage rate (cost of capital) F and the proceedings of the mark-up factor. XT are exports 
that are domestic tradable goods bought by the foreign agent. The last term in equation 
<19> stands for the endogenous mark-up (positive) or internal subsidy (negative) 
computed as the difference between the benchmark tariff 1/ (as seen by customers) and  
PR 
Market equilibrium conditions 
 Equations (20) to (27) represent the equilibrium conditions for factors used 
domestically, and (28) is the equilibrium condition for the foreign factor. Equations (25) 
to (27) correspond to equilibrium in markets for goods: regulated, non regulated and 
imports.  
<20> 1 2 R NL L L L L     
<21>         ( 1,2)T TK K T   
<22> N NK K  
<23> m T
T
F F F   
<24> , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )R R R R T T T T R N N N R
T
G L K q a F L K a H L K c     
<25> , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )
s
T T T T T R R R T N N N T TF L K x a G L K a H L K c x      
<26> , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )N N N T T T T N R R R N
T
H L K a F L K a G L K c    
<27> *sm m m   
 
Trade balance 
We can now see how the relation between the mark-up factor (and its mechanism 
of adjustment) and the trade balance arises in the model. From <1>: 
/{ } /{ }
 * ( , )IR R I I I R R R R
I R I R
p c p c p m wL r K tP G L K         
and since: 
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/{ } /{ }
( , )IR R I I I R R R R
I R I R
p c p c px wL r K tP G L K        
<28>  * (1 )[ ( , )]R R R Rpx p m tp G L K      
The left hand side is the trade balance and the right hand is the foreign share in 
regulated sector profits.5 
This equation shows the link between the regulatory regime and the trade account. 
However this presentation is too restricted. In fact, domestic ownership is not sufficient 
to break the dilemma; domestic agents could reveal preference for foreign assets or 
goods, and put pressure on the trade balance anyhow. On the other hand, foreign 
ownership is not necessarily a source of stress on trade surplus, for example if profits 
are reinvested in the country. 
A more general model should include more elaboration on the domestic and 
foreign agents portfolio and investment decisions.  
 
4. The Social Accounting Matrix. 
 To keep the model within conceptual explorations, we constructed a small SAM 
that reflects acceptable proportions for a developing economy with relevant state owned 
enterprises participation. 
 The SAM represents an initial condition with prevalence of the state companies’ 
technology. More than ever, this is a theoretical exploration using numbers, in the sense 
of Piggott and the model is a special case of the general system presented above. 
 Table 1 presents the SAM. The rows show markets and the columns budgetary 
constraints. Notice that the subsidy granted to the public utilities in government hands is 
represented as a positive entry of $12973 in the corresponding column. H, PU, RW and 
G stand for Household, Public Utility and Rest of the World and Government, and L, K 
and FF for labor, specific capital and mobile capital respectively. M1 and M2 represent 
imports; in this version we do not have imports of intermediate goods to be used by 
industries. 
 
                                               
5 The trade balance must compensate the current account result. Notice that it is not influenced by 
entrance and exit of capital “in the same period”: the net impact is: - rRKR. 
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TABLE 1: A SAM for modeling alternative technologies 
  Agriculture Industry Services P.U. (old)  P.U. (new) H G RW Total 
Agriculture 26,931 -18,422 -377 -163 -2 -2,058  -5,909 0
Industry -4,479 100,285 -16,549 -4,533 -48 -55,760  -18,916 0
Services -2,407 -18,658 168,206 -6,381 -67 -140,693    0
P.U. (old) -605 -5,955 -5,424 23,778  -11,794    0
P.U. (new) -7 -72 -66  285 -140    0
L -4,832 -22,636 -64,477 -25,675 -68 117,688    0
K -14,600 -34,542 -81,313 0 0 130,455    0
FF         -100     100 0
Subsidy       12,973   -12,973  0
Tax           -12,973 12,973  0
M1           -732  732 0
M2           -23,993  23,993 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
 
 The state companies technology produces slightly more than 1% of total sales of 
infrastructure services ($285 of $24063), and receives a subsidy from the government of 
about 35% of total costs. This subsidy is financed with a tax on the household’s income. 
 
5. Alternative technologies and model solutions. 
 
The first solution involves computing the initial subsidy that maintains the state 
owned company working at its observed levels however its inefficiency. Service 
obligations are met with the installed technology, less efficient in use of intermediate 
inputs and labor than the imported one.  
For the initial benchmark calibration we assume that LR is used in fixed 
coefficients in the domestic estate company, so that instead of (12) we have the non 
negativity condition: 
 aT,RpT +bN,RpN+aL,Rw – s  0 . 
The subsidy s is computed initially so that the excess of costs of the state owned 
enterprise are compensated and its production is equal to observed quantities. That is, s 
is determined to replicate given productions of the estate owned enterprise and of the 
private owned company; for example, if 70% of total production is obtained from the 
state owned company, and the rest from the alternative technology, s is computed to 
match those observed levels of production. The subsidy is financed with taxes on 
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households income; this first simulation assumes therefore that taxes do not create costs 
of distortion. 
The alternative technology exhibits constant returns to scale, and uses domestic 
intermediate inputs and mobile capital to produce the regulated good or service. For this 
technology we also assume fixed coefficients in this presentation, and the price is fixed 
at its cost of production: 
 a* T,R pT +b* N,RpN+a* L,Rw* = p*R,  
where the *) stands for the input coefficients of the mobile capital technology, and p*R is 
the price of the infrastructure service when produced with the imported standards. 
It is assumed that the rate of profit is given at the level of the cost of opportunity 
of capital in the rest of the world, and that capital in the regulated sector is no longer 
sunk. It is an implicit cost-plus mechanism with a minimum rate of return given by the 
international productivity of capital. In this case KR becomes a variable to be 
determined; it will be included in equation (11) in the definition of profits, with a cost 
given by w*. The variable will also enter in equation (23), since it is part of the uses of 
capital of the rest of the world. The trade balance equilibrium condition becomes 
simply:  
 
pT x – pm m = R + w*KR. 
 
Given the initial subsidy s, the simulations explore the effects of assuming 
reductions in w*. Changes in w* are compensated in order not to change relative prices 
of exports and imports.  The model chooses the less costly between the internal cost of 
the subsidy and the alternative technology, to maximize welfare of the domestic 
household.   
Table 2 shows the results of three simulations. The first two explore a threshold 
for the cost of mobile capital: which is the level of w* such that the local public 
technology is substituted by the new imported technology? The first scenario 
contemplates full substitution and the second, only partial. Initially we calibrate the 
model so that 99% of the total production of utilities is provided using the old 
technology and only one percent with the new mobile capital; full substitution occurs 
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when those percentages are reverted (we do not take 100% to avoid potential 
computational problems). It can be seen that a reduction of approximately 12% in the 
rate of return of the rest of the world capital leads to a full replacement, and about the 
half of that reduction is needed to replace half of the share. Both simulations take as 
given the initial subsidy for the state owned enterprise. 
 However, it can be argued that the subsidies is conditional to the “international 
price” of the service. In fact, though the public service cannot be imported, mobile 
capital can be internalised to produce domestically. Therefore, the cost of one unit of 
service produced with the new technology puts an implicit cap on the domestic price of 
services. In that case, a reduction of w* could be followed by further reductions in s, 
unless there is a quota or explicit ban to imports. 
The subsidy s is an implicit rent of a sunk factor, and this explains why 
admitting that it is endogenous could not lead to a substitution of the technology. 
 That is why we consider the third simulation. Instead of reducing w* we consider 
reductions in the subsidy s for a given level of the cost of mobile capital. Notice that in 
this case, the old and public technology is fully substituted when the subsidy is reduced 
15%. 
 The results of reductions in the cost of mobile capital and in subsidies given to 
old public companies are shown as gains both in GDP and in households´ welfare. The 
latter is computed as the Equivalent Variation. When the new technology is fully 
adopted, households enjoy welfare levels that are equivalent to initial income increases 
of 5.6% and 5%. 
 It can be seen however that the new technology adoption is demanding for the 
trade balance and requires additional export effort by the economy; this effort is 
equivalent to w*KR since we assume that we are in a stationary state, so that initial entry 
of capital +KR  is compensated in the same period with an outflow –KR; when the 
reimbursement of the principal encompasses several periods, the stress on the 
forthcoming trade balances will be higher and the net effect will depend also on the 
gains obtained with the initial inflows and the uses given to those funds. 
 Table 2 also alerts on potential conflicts. Nominal and real wages fell in all 
scenarios; this is due to the need of rewarding mobile capital. Since labour is not mobile 
it must face  -directly or indirectly- the costs of “purchasing” the new technology. 
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 It is important to remember that these simulations have been performed using 
non distortionary taxation and so we should expect faster substitution when taxes on 


























GDP (% variation) 7.2 3.8 7.1 
Agriculture 4.5 2.3 4.8 
Industry 11.3 5.8 11.6 
Services 6.6 3.4 6.5 
Public Utilities  3.5 2.4 2.5 
Old Tech. Participation in Public utilities production (benchmark 99%) 1% 50% 1% 
New Tech. Participation in Public utilities production (benchmark 1%) 99% 50% 99% 
RPI (% variation) -3.0 -1.6 -3.2 
Agriculture 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Industry 1.1 0.6 0.9 
Services -4.0 -2.2 -4.8 
Public Utilities -8.8 -4.7 -4.4 
Exports (% variation) 44.3 23.1 48.5 
Imports (% variation) 5.6 2.8 5.0 
Household Welfare (% variation) 5.6 2.8 5 
Foreign Capital Price (% variation) -11.6 -6.2 0 
Domestic Subsidy (% variation) - - -15.4 
Rate of Return (% variation) 6.1 3.1 5.2 
Agriculture 5.4 2.8 5.6 
Industry 15.7 8 15.2 
Services 2.2 1 0.8 




6. Lessons from the exercises. 
 
 The simulations confirm that the choice of the technology to be used for 
servicing infrastructure depends on deep parameters of efficiency and costs.  
It does not say why state owned companies could be more inefficient than 
private ones, but given those inefficiencies that create costs in terms of resources and 
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distortions, the choice of the technology is not necessarily determined; it depends on the 
magnitude of waste and on the costs in the allocation of resources relative to the price of 
mobile capital (and implicitly on the export effort of the country). 
The model shows that there are plausible scenarios where the selection is not 
unique.  
We have left aside additional characteristics related to the technologies that 
could favour one or the other. For example, corruption and passive deficit could lead to 
hyperinflation in a context of state owned enterprises, or chronic misallocation of 
resources reduce investments and destroy the base of capital of government companies. 
Also, we have not considered potential constraints on less developing countries exports, 
that could also increase significantly the cost of raising foreign currency to honour the 
payment of dividends to mobile capital.  
We have not considered the possibility of using domestic capital to produce the 
service of infrastructure; the idea was to consider extreme cases that could give a 
confirmation of the basic intuition, and to check that that intuition was not rejected by 
general equilibrium effects.  
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